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# **MOBILIZING THE RESERVE FORCES IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY**

**REPORT OF THE DoD MOBILIZATION SYMPOSIUM  
NOVEMBER 18-20, 2002**

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***Mobilizing the Reserve Forces in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century***  
Report of the DoD Mobilization Symposium

Co-sponsored by: *The Honorable Thomas F. Hall,*  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs  
and  
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Director for Logistics, J-4, The Joint Staff

## **PREFACE**

The use of Reserve forces in Operations NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM represents the largest mobilization since Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM and the first protracted, continuous Reserve force employment since the Vietnam War. As the second year of this mobilization continues, it is time to review the policies and procedures that underlie the mobilization process to ensure that they are responsive to 21<sup>st</sup> century operational requirements.

As the centerpiece for this review, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Joint Staff jointly sponsored a mobilization symposium. The working symposium brought together a large group of participants from across the Defense Department to share their experiences during the recent mobilization, identify areas that need to be changed in the mobilization process, and offer solutions for implementation. Only with an understanding of the issues, the best solutions, and the responsible organizations can change be possible.

This report contains the results of the symposium. It offers many recommendations for improving the mobilization process. Some are near term actions; others will require further study. However, all the recommendations offer ways to improve the mobilization process so that it is more efficient and effective in providing essential capabilities in the future.



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## SUMMARY

In the year since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Reserve components have been used extensively in support of Operations NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM, with nearly 100,000 men and women mobilized. As this mobilization began its second year, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness directed a review of the mobilization process to determine whether the process is serving the needs of the Department today. What improvements are needed in the process? What policy, legislative, or resource changes should be initiated?

Led by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Joint Staff, Director for Logistics, a review of the mobilization process is being conducted in three phases: a survey of Service and Combatant Command after action reports identified key issues and challenges in the current mobilization process; a mobilization symposium brought together a wide variety of participants to prioritize problems and identify recommended solutions; and post-symposium activities will develop an action plan and identify responsible organizations to implement the symposium recommendations.

*The review has found that the current mobilization process is not sufficiently responsive to 21<sup>st</sup> century operational requirements and will not serve the nation well in the future, given likely demands on the force. While current processes get the job done, they are far from efficient in an environment where processes need to be rapid, flexible, and visible. Continuous improvement is essential, and the recommendations put forward in this review are the foundation for change.*

Recommendations to improve the mobilization process emerged along five themes, each of which is addressed in the following sections.

## Shorten the Mobilization Timeline

The mobilization timeline begins with the identification of a force requirement and extends until individuals and units are deployed to meet those requirements. While the current process works to a large degree, it is inefficient, it takes too long, and it is not as responsive as the current environment demands. What is needed instead is a process that supports a rapid, flexible “just-in-time” approach to mobilization. Improvements can be made in many areas; some of the most significant include the following:

- Greater effort should be given to prioritizing requests for forces and processing requirements as they are generated. The requirements validation process needs to become more parallel and collaborative, rather than sequential. Making greater use of automation is a key enabler to a more streamlined, collaborative process.
- Resources need to be invested to enhance individual and unit readiness, with particular emphasis on the medical aspects of member processing, security clearance processing, training for mobilization, and equipment processing. By improving readiness, the Department will be better able to provide reservists adequate notice of pending mobilizations.
- Individual replacement operations need to be simplified so that all the Services are able to allow for substitution of Reserve service members to fulfill capabilities without having to restart the approval process.

## Tailor Forces

To meet the requirements of the Global War on Terror, the Services are using forces in different ways than planned. Employing derivative units – or portions of existing units – is one approach. But ad hoc use of tailored forces creates challenges for



the Total Force. The Services need to better understand the long-term impact of the use of derivative units and other tailored force structure concepts on force readiness, adaptability, and individual retention. More specifically, the Services need to:

- Develop policies and procedures that support the use of tailored forces, while recognizing and mitigating the risks.
- Plan and train for the use of tailored forces. Shared lessons and experiences among the Services can be valuable in expanding the use of flexible force structure options, which many feel will be essential in the future.
- Better manage the Individual Ready Reserve, as an option for meeting capability needs.

### Adopt Best Business Practices

Adopting best business practices can have a significant impact on the efficiency of the mobilization process. The following recommendations target those areas that have raised the most concern during the current mobilization.

- Responsibility for mobilization is fragmented throughout the Services, creating inefficiencies. It is time to assign responsibility for integration and synchronization of the overall process.
- The growth in Combatant Command staff augmentation needs to be checked. The Combatant Commanders need to work with the Joint Staff and the Services to determine peacetime, surge and wartime staffing requirements and incorporate these requirements into requisite manning documents.
- The absence of an automated system to track requirements, personnel, units, and transportation assets slows the mobilization process. While a long-

run system is in development, the Services must comply with and allocate the resources necessary to meet DoD personnel contingency reporting requirements to improve tracking capabilities in the near term.

- In some cases, Service and component policies in areas such as stop loss, pay, and allowances seem inequitable. While these policies must remain the responsibility of the Services, there is room to achieve greater consistency and equity in compensation policies.

## Make Judicious Use of Reserve Forces

It is more critical than ever that the Department make the most judicious use of the Reserve forces, particularly in what looks to be a protracted period of high operational tempo. A number of steps can be taken to include the following.

- Rather than explicitly limit the duration of initial mobilization orders, the Department should publish a “SecDef’s intent” that emphasizes judicious use of reserve members without restricting Service flexibility.
- Volunteers can play a positive role before and during mobilization. The Department needs a broad and flexible volunteer policy that allows the Services to use volunteers when, and for as long a duration, as practicable.
- The multiple involuntary activation authorities, under which the Department is operating today, should be retained. They offer flexibility for the Services while ensuring predictability for service members.

## Ensure Adequate Support

Despite significant improvements in recent years, there remains a widespread lack of understanding of all facets of support including benefits, protections, and responsibilities. Communication between the Department, service members, families, and employers needs to be strengthened. Additional resources are needed in all areas of support – individual, family, and employer.

- The Services need to explore innovative options to improve healthcare education. A number of promising demonstration projects offer ways to improve healthcare support and should be expanded.
- Family readiness must be integrated into the mobilization readiness process. In addition, the Services need to work together to ensure that support services are more accessible and to standardize minimum essential family services.
- Regular communication with employers is critical to sustaining needed support as the mobilization continues. Accurate employer data is essential and must become a mandatory reporting requirement for reservists.

The end game is this: to get the right reservist, to the right place, at the right time, with the right equipment, for the right mission, to support their active-duty counterparts, and then to return home again as soon as it is judiciously possible. The recommendations presented in this report provide a foundation for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the mobilization process for National Guard and Reserve forces. Implementation will require leadership within the Department; cooperation and support from Congress; and collaboration among the Military Services, their Components, and the defense agencies.



## **INTRODUCTION**

Over the past decade, the Reserve components have become an integral part of military operations. They played a significant role in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and in subsequent operations. Reserve forces have proved to be an effective way to augment, reinforce, and complement active-duty forces during both peacetime and crisis.

The post September 11, 2001, mobilization of the Reserve components was the largest since the Gulf War. Nearly 100,000 men and women in the Reserve components have been mobilized in support of Operations NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM. On June 30, 2002, at the peak of the mobilization, 77,455 reservists were called to active duty; about 50,000 remain on active duty today. In addition, many reservists support these operations in a voluntary status.

This mobilization has been one of the most successful in America's history, despite the personal sacrifice that has been endured. It showed the progress that has been made in integrating Reserve forces with their active duty counterparts, and it highlighted the many talents within the Reserve components. Reservists have performed satisfactorily every mission assigned – a positive reflection on the readiness of the force.

But the Global War on Terror will be a long struggle, not a short one. Its demands on the military will require a sustained level of commitment and preparation beyond a few months or a few years. This will be a new challenge for the Total Force. Force capabilities between active and reserve forces must be rebalanced to meet changing requirements and to ensure Reserve force capabilities – some of which have been activated repeatedly over the past decade – are maintained for the long run. Creating a

proper balance will ensure the Guard and Reserve are used judiciously and effectively in all future operations.

*In this light, the current mobilization process is not sufficiently responsive to 21<sup>st</sup> century operational requirements and will not serve the nation well in the future. While current processes get the job done, they are far from efficient in an environment where processes need to be characterized by flexibility, speed, agility, and visibility. Continuous improvement is essential, and motivating change is the purpose of this review.*

## **IMPROVING THE MOBILIZATION PROCESS**

As the basis for change, it is essential to review the policies and procedures that underlie the mobilization process – identifying what works, what does not, and what actions can be taken to improve the process. This review of the mobilization process proceeded in three phases. First, a literature review examined the after action reports submitted by the Services and Combatant Commands describing their experiences in Operations NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM. As the centerpiece of the effort, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and The Joint Staff Director for Logistics, J-4 co-sponsored a DoD Mobilization Symposium. Finally, post-symposium activities are focused on translating symposium results into actions for implementation.

### **Literature Review**

In phase one, the Reserve Affairs/Joint Staff team reviewed documents and reports from the Military Services and Combatant Commands describing the challenges that have arisen during the current mobilization and the lessons derived from those experiences. As a complement to the literature review, an internet-based forum was created to invite participants in the mobilization process to offer additional issues, lessons learned, and recommended actions to improve mobilization procedures.

The common issues and themes drawn from both written reports and the forum became the basis for developing the symposium agenda – the panel presentations and discussion groups that would occur during the first two days of the event.

## The Symposium

The working symposium assembled senior leaders from across the Department, Services, Combatant Commands, Agencies, and Components to review the mobilization process.<sup>1</sup> *The goal of the conference: to identify new policies, processes, and practices needed to more effectively mobilize the Reserve forces in the 21<sup>st</sup> century – recommendations for change that could make the process more relevant and efficient.*

Nearly 300 individuals participated in the two and a half day symposium, including 100 general officers, flag officers, and senior executive officials. The time devoted by the attendees was evidence of the importance and relevance of the topic – one that is on the minds of many in the Department today. The experience and knowledge brought to bear ensured serious thought and lively debate on the subjects addressed. It was the collective judgment of this group – based on their involvement in, and understanding of, the mobilization process – that served as the basis for the symposium’s results and recommendations.

To accomplish its goal, the symposium was structured in two parts. On the first day, discussion panels addressed the successes and challenges of the current mobilization from a variety of perspectives. The experiences shared by the speakers validated

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<sup>1</sup> Conference attendees included representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, all the Military Services and Components, the Combatant Commands, Defense Agencies, senior service colleges, the Reserve Forces Policy Board, and Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve.

the key themes that resonated from the literature review. The panels covered four broad areas:<sup>2</sup>

- ***Foundations of Mobilization.*** This panel set the strategic foundation for the conference. It examined the structure of the current mobilization process, the underlying laws, and the major participants in the process.
- ***Operators—Requirement Generators and Mobilization Customers.*** This panel examined Reserve mobilization through the lens of the customer. Panel members covered issues such as force requirements, the process for acquiring forces, the readiness of Reserve forces, and how well the current process is working.
- ***Mobilization Policy and Resources—The Successes and Challenges.*** The third panel addressed Reserve mobilization from the perspective of those who set policy, provide resources, and validate requirements for the mobilization, deployment, and demobilization of Reserve forces.
- ***Force Providers—Generating Warfighting Capabilities.*** The final panel discussed mobilization from the perspective of the force providers, focusing on the common, every day issues that reduce efficiency in the mobilization process—resource constraints, readiness concerns, information flow, and care of the troops.

To complement the panel presentations, five breakout groups spent the second day of the conference in working sessions that focused on crafting solutions to key problems in the mobilization process—on identifying actions for change. The panel discussions from the previous day, which provided a

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<sup>2</sup> Appendix A contains a list of the members of each panel.



“perspective from the field,” served to prioritize and focus the topics addressed by these working groups. The five groups and the key issues they addressed are as follows:

- ***Readiness—Readying the Force to Mobilize.*** The Reserve components could have been better prepared to support Operations NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Three readiness areas stood out: member processing, security clearances, and training exercises and evaluation.
- ***Planning—Meeting Combatant Commanders’ Requirements.*** The process of identifying, validating, and filling the requirements generated by the Combatant Commands is in need of an overhaul. In addition, the use of tailored and derivative forces has increased in recent years, presenting a new array of challenges for the Total Force.
- ***Execution—The Mobilization Process from Alert to Demobilization.*** The Department currently has no method of maintaining visibility of personnel assets from alert to demobilization, back to the community, and return to duty as a drilling reserve member—a condition that creates inefficiencies in the process and must be resolved.
- ***Support—Individual, Family, and Employer Support.*** Assuring individual and family well being and good health, maintaining effective civilian employer relations, and providing and ensuring healthcare support for Reserve component members are critical concerns when Reserve component members are absent from families and employers for extended periods of time.
- ***Policy—Mobilization and Demobilization Personnel and Pay Policy.*** Mobilization and demobilization

personnel and pay policies affect how Reserve component personnel are called to active duty, compensated, used, retained beyond normal release dates, exempted from mobilization, and demobilized. Today, many policies work at odds with an efficient personnel mobilization process.

On the final morning of the symposium, the results and recommendations from the working groups were briefed to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Dr. David S. C. Chu.

## Post Symposium Activities

The results of the mobilization symposium underscored the need for change and the importance of taking action. In the final phase of this review, an action plan will be developed based on the recommendations from the symposium. It will involve identifying those changes that can be made in the near, medium, and far term; determining what funding, policy, and legislative initiatives will be needed for implementation; and identifying who will take responsibility for each respective action. A mobilization working group – comprised of representatives from the Military Services, the Joint Staff, and various Offices of the Secretary of Defense – will be formed to take the lead on implementation activities.

## KEY THEMES

Drawing from the panel discussions and breakout sessions, recommendations to improve to the mobilization process emerged along five themes. These themes, which are addressed in subsequent sections of this report, are as follows:


- Shorten the mobilization timeline
- Tailor forces

- Adopt best business practices
  - Organizational accountability
  - Joint billet validation
  - Automation
  - Equity (pay and benefits)
- Make judicious use of Reserve forces
- Ensure adequate support
  - Healthcare, family, employer

## SHORTEN THE MOBILIZATION TIMELINE

The mobilization timeline spans the period from when the Combatant Commander first identifies a force requirement to the point when individuals and units are deployed, as depicted in Figure 1. It is a complex process that involves many organizations including the Combatant Commands, the Military Services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Congress, and the President.

*Figure 1. The Mobilization Timeline: Requirement to Deployment*



While the process works to a large degree, it simply takes too long. It tends to lead to a “just in case” approach to mobilization – where requirements may be overestimated to ensure mission capability in the face of unknowns, avoiding the need to repeat the lengthy, bureaucratic process. In an environment where operational requirements are changing and

often unclear at the outset, a process is needed that supports a more rapid and flexible “just in time” approach to mobilization.

In evaluating ways to shorten the mobilization timeline, it is important to recognize that the mobilization process operates in three primary modes. The first is the deliberate planning process. This process begins with the Defense Planning Guidance and other departmental guidance; involves debate among the Combatant Commands, the Joint Staff, and the Services as to how the guidance should be met; and results in operational and supporting plans. The deliberate planning process can take years. The other extreme is emergency response. In this mode, the Department will operate as quickly as possible to secure appropriate authorities and deploy forces. It is a crisis action response, such as what the nation witnessed immediately after the September 11, 2001 attacks.

In the middle is an abbreviated planning process, which characterizes today’s environment. The Department is adapting to changing situations around the world that require adjustments to operational plans and force requirements – not at a crisis action pace, but neither with the long debate and evaluation of the deliberate planning process. Thus the Services must operate without approved, off-the-shelf plans, making real-time decisions on personnel, units, and equipment needed to respond to mission requirements. It is this mode that needs most attention, as it is a likely steady state for some time to come and it is in this environment that the Services are most likely to encounter problems in the mobilization process.

The mobilization process is not as responsive as it needs to be in today’s rapidly changing environment. Within some Services, the total mobilization process can take as long as 123 days – in some cases even longer. Shortening the mobilization timeline requires an examination of each step in the process: requirements, validation, sourcing, alert, and mobilization.

Opportunities exist in each phase to streamline tasks and create efficiencies.

## ***FORCE REQUIREMENTS, VALIDATION, AND SOURCING***

The process of identifying, validating, and filling requirements generated by the Combatant Commands is in need of an overhaul. The current linear, non-collaborative approach does not allow for adequate dialogue to ensure that accurately defined requirements are filled with the best available capability. It also fails to ensure that personnel and equipment are aligned in a timely manner with the appropriate transportation resources required to employ them. A number of steps can be taken to improve these processes, including better planning, more effective processing, sequential decision making, and the use of automation.

### **Planning**

Service planners have little input or participation in Combatant Commands' contingency planning activities. As a result, they cannot be proactive in tailoring forces or anticipating requirements. If Combatant Commanders and their staffs can be more forward looking in considering requirements and provide early warning, even in today's environment, it would help the Services respond to their requests – both in meeting deadlines and in synchronizing capabilities with transportation and reception assets.

Furthermore, the process is not flexible enough to respond to changing requirements. The Global War on Terror is not being conducted according to an off-the-shelf plan. Requirements are constantly changing and must be continually revalidated; the process must have the flexibility to cope. During the past year, requirements changes in some cases meant reservists reported for

duty, but ended without a mission assignment for several months. Being able to better respond to such may require non-standard solutions and a process that can support that need.

A review of the Department's Crisis Action Planning Process could offer ideas on how to restructure and/or eliminate portions of the requirements process to make it more flexible and responsive in today's environment. Some standardization of the process across the Services could also help to achieve this goal. The Services need to review their internal mobilization processes to determine whether additional standardization is feasible and/or desirable.

## Processing

More effort should be given to prioritizing requests for forces and processing requirements as they are generated – not accumulating “batches” of requirements before submission. Combatant Commands and the Joint Staff batch requests to mobilize Reserve component forces to avoid repeatedly completing the approval process for each request. Batching places requirements for forces in a holding pattern, which takes up time. By eliminating batching, the time between identifying a requirement and delivery of forces can be shortened – in some cases, up to 30 days. The efficiency of delivering forces will also be enhanced when commands prioritize their requirements and standards for action are established based on a system of prioritization.

## Sequential Decision Making

The current mobilization is very sequential: the Combatant Commands develop requirements, the Joint Staff validates the requirements, they are approved by the Secretary of Defense, and finally the Services provide forces to meet the requirement. The process takes a tremendous amount of time; it is not collaborative or synchronized. The delays that ensue encourage efforts to

work around the system to request individual or unit capabilities directly from the Services.

Instead, the process needs to be configured so that sequential decision making is replaced with a parallel and collaborative process. With a more collaborative process, all organizations can interact and staff requirements near simultaneously, shortening the response time and providing a vehicle for collaboration on force employment decisions.

Policy changes are also needed to eliminate redundant actions in the staffing process. Only steps that contribute to the prudent and judicious use of Reserve forces should be incorporated. A more streamlined process will help to ensure that service members receive maximum notice of a pending mobilization and will support the timely delivery of Reserve capabilities to the fight. Close to two-dozen approvals are needed to mobilize one unit or individual—a combination of streamlining and sequential processing can save considerable time in validation and sourcing.

## Process Automation

Improvements to joint automated and decision support systems would also lead to more rapid validation and sourcing and enhanced training and readiness—in effect improving management of the overall process. Today the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System provides limited visibility into mobilization activities in support of contingency operations, but could be improved. A more efficient automated system should provide full visibility into mobilization requirements from request to force deployment. All participants involved in staffing requirements could have visibility early in the process, so that all levels of staffing can begin when a requirement is identified—creating the more collaborative process that is desired.



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***Recommendations  
Force Requirement***

Prioritize requests

Don't batch requests—process as requirement is generated

Replace sequential decision making with a parallel and collaborative process

***Validation and Sourcing***

Improve Joint automated support systems

Eliminate redundancy of actions

Adapt an automated system as enabler to streamline and manage the process

Replace sequential decision making with a parallel and collaborative process

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***ALERT***

The Department of Defense has established in policy a goal to provide reservists a minimum of 30 days written notification before being mobilized for active duty. There is little disagreement that this is a reasonable goal – generally acceptable by service members and the Services. It is also well understood that operational requirements may override this goal in some instances.

However, the alert period frequently gets squeezed because other parts of the mobilization process bog down. Resources need to be invested to enhance individual and unit readiness and reengineer other parts of the mobilization process so the 30-day goal can be met, to the extent possible. One of the most significant lessons of the past year was that some of the Reserve components could have been better prepared in a number of

areas: member processing, particularly medical; the security clearance process; training; and equipment processing.

## Member Processing

Member processing is an area where improvements can be made to reduce the mobilization timeline. A key concern is the need to better track medical conditions to ensure that reservists assigned to particular units are in fact able to deploy when needed. The experience by some of the Services during Operations NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM indicated that medical and dental deficiencies and optometry needs were relatively common and resulted in mobilization delays.

A number of initiatives would improve medical readiness. First, resources could be applied to conducting pre-mobilization medical screening, with results updated in an overall force tracking system. Changes in laws and regulations should be made to allow troops access to medical and dental care during the pre-mobilization period. Many health-related problems encountered during the past year could have been averted with these two changes.

In more general terms, the Department also needs to conduct a functional assessment of the member processing area from beginning to end. Core elements of the process could be standardized – such as legal and financial counseling, medical screening, and vaccinations – but the Services also need flexibility to meet Service-specific needs. An overall assessment should examine requirements, output, and timing with an eye toward streamlining and simplification.

## Security Clearances

Problems obtaining security clearances detract from effective use of the Reserve components. Obtaining the required security

clearances in a timely way is a longstanding challenge and can lead to delays in mobilizing the force. Several steps need to be taken to improve the clearance process.

First, the Services need to reexamine and revalidate the requirements for security clearances. Often, for example, the use of secure systems at command headquarters require all individuals working in that location to have high level clearances even if they are doing unclassified work. Are there areas where the number and level of clearances can be safely reduced? Do soldiers performing military police duties need clearances, for example? These questions need to be addressed.

The Services need to ensure that sufficient resources are devoted to security matters. There is a temptation to reduce unit security management during peacetime, which creates problems during periods of surge and mobilization. The Services need knowledgeable people in units that understand security. Often because of a lack of security knowledge, existing authorities are not well understood or used to the greatest advantage.

In addition, the Department needs to change security clearance policies to allow maximum use of interim clearances. When possible, and without jeopardizing national defense, Reserve service members should be granted an interim security clearance before the member is ordered to mobilize. The duration of the clearances should extend for a period of time that will ensure no lapse of capability before a final clearance is granted.

## Mobilization for Training

The Global War on Terror requires agile and flexible forces capable of being rapidly trained and mobilized. Many of the training strategies in place today were designed to support a more deliberate process with longer deployment times and sufficient time to train to predictable skill requirements,

particularly for large reserve formations needed to prosecute a war. With the more unpredictable nature of today's security environment, the Services are deploying individuals and units that are tailored for a specific mission. This often means using smaller, non-standard or "ad hoc" derivative units that require non-standard options for training.

Current laws preclude involuntary mobilization for training non-qualified Reserve component personnel prior to unit deployment. To enhance individual and unit readiness, members could be mobilized to receive requisite training to meet deployment standards or duty position qualifications. Under the partial mobilization authority, the Reserve components can be involuntary mobilized to active duty – other than for training – for not more than 24 consecutive months. Under this authority, the Services are restricted to conducting training as part of the post-mobilization, pre-deployment phase. No authority exists to bring reservists onto active duty for training, release the trained member from active duty, and subsequently mobilize them for deployment – an agile approach that would leverage the time available prior to mobilization and add flexibility to the mobilization process.

The Department can pursue a number of alternatives to expand the options to mobilize members for the purpose of training – amendments to 10 USC 12302, amendments to 10 USC 10147, or departmental policy guidance issued by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

## Equipment Processing

The readiness improvements described thus far have focused on personnel readiness, but improvements can also be made to expedite equipment processing. Some of the most important areas of concern include maintenance checks to determine if equipment is mission capable, cross leveling equipment to bring

a unit to mission readiness, and more timely shipping of personal supplemental equipment.

In some cases, active and reserve units do not always use the same equipment, which requires a Service to “cross-level” equipment when a reserve unit is called to active duty. A common example is communications equipment. In the Army, for example, active units use SINGARS radios, while many reserve units still use VCR 12 radios that cannot communicate with the new systems. When reserve units are mobilized, they must be outfitted with up-to-date equipment to ensure interoperability with active units in the field. The Services need to develop innovative ways to cross level equipment early in the alert phase, to avoid delays in unit deployment.

Some of the Services experienced difficulty during the past year ensuring individual soldiers were supplied with supplemental equipment such as flak jackets, additional uniforms, chemical/biological suits, gas masks, and night vision goggles. Problems arose in several areas. In some cases bottlenecks occurred when ordering clothing and equipment through the central supply system – with order times several weeks or longer, delaying unit deployment.

In other cases, there was a lack of communication between the gaining command, the mobilization station, and the home station concerning what equipment a unit would bring with them when mobilized. Cases occurred where units would arrive at their mobilization station without certain equipment and the mobilization center was not prepared to supply the unit. The Services need to focus on ways to avoid these delays. One consideration is giving home stations more responsibility for fielding personal supplemental equipment and developing more timely approaches to equipment processing.

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***Recommendations***  
***Alert***

Access to TRICARE and Veterans Services to enhance readiness

Priority for security clearance investigations—maximize use of interim clearances

During drill periods, permit medical and dental treatment by Reserve component medical and dental personnel

Identify selected unit personnel for early mobilization for duty qualification training

Ship supplemental personnel equipment to home-station for M-day issue

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***MOBILIZATION***

There is no efficient mechanism to substitute individuals within units identified in Force Deployment Options (FDOs) once the FDO is planned for execution. The process is not sufficiently responsive to mission changes or to changes in requirements that occur after an initial request is made but before a unit or individual is cleared to mobilize. Furthermore, there are redundancies in the process as well – with elements of the process repeated at home stations and mobilization stations.

Individual replacement operations need to be simplified. The Services should allow for substitution (within rule sets) of Reserve service members to fulfill capabilities without having to restart the approval process in the event a service member cannot be deployed. When the approval process must be repeated at the Service level, it delays delivery of required capabilities to the Combatant Commands or results in delivery of a degraded capability. Substitution policies must be used mindful of the balance needed between meeting Combatant Commander

requirements and providing predictability to Reserve members and their families.

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***Recommendations***  
***Mobilization***

Simplify individual replacement operations

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## **TAILOR FORCES**

To meet the requirements of the Global War on Terror, the Services are using forces in different ways than planned. One option for tailoring forces for non-standard missions is the use of derivative units, commonly referred to as derivative UICs. The essence of the concept is to create substructures out of units, employing a portion of a unit or a small number of individuals from many units to create a capability. The approach provides flexibility in meeting requirements and supports the judicious use of forces, in that only the specific forces needed are actually employed.

However, using derivative units creates a new array of challenges for the Total Force, particularly when created and employed in an ad hoc manner. Derivative units are thrust into a new command structure when deployed. How well the units are integrated into this structure can have an important impact on combat effectiveness. When a portion of a unit is deployed, it disrupts unit structures. The “stay at home” portion of the unit can no longer fight as a unit until reconstituted – potentially reducing flexibility and capability for a future fight. If the unit is later deployed as a whole, some parts of the unit may be on their second or third rotation. Moreover, forces typically train and mobilize as a unit and are not necessarily well prepared to mobilize in a piecemeal fashion. Piecemeal use of units can also affect morale and unit cohesion.

Despite the drawbacks, many believe that the use of tailored forces such as derivative units is likely to increase. In that light, it is important to better understand the impact of this approach on force readiness, adaptability, and on individual retention. Current policies and processes do not readily support the use of tailored and derivative units. Employing forces in non-standard ways creates a demand for non-standard solutions for developing and training force structure. What force structure concepts or



force structure development options can be employed to mitigate the challenges that derivative units create?

## ***MINIMIZING RISKS***

The Department and the Services need to develop policies and procedures that better support the use of tailored forces, while recognizing potential risks. Planning and training for the use of tailored forces, rather than operating in an ad hoc fashion, can minimize the negative impacts of tailoring. Improved readiness reporting that captures derivative units – something needed in general – can also mitigate some of the impact on force flexibility. Delegating authority for force substitution can also have benefit. In some of the Services, the Army in particular, commanders are required to go through the entire approval process again if an individual is considered non-deployable; the Navy and Air Force have delegated authority to lower levels. Revisiting the approval process delays deployment and makes the use of tailored forces less effective.

## ***EXPLORING FORCE STRUCTURE OPTIONS***

In general, there is a limited understanding about the long-term impact of the use of tailored forces. The Services need to further explore options for designing flexible force structure and understand the impact of these options. To the extent that derivative units are used, commanders must organize for and employ training guidance and plans that recognize the likelihood of deploying derivative units to multiple commands.

The Services currently approach the use of partial units differently and some are more effective at it than others. The Air Force deploys by platform and already uses multi-component units in the rotation scheme for their Aerospace Expeditionary Forces. The Navy tends to use individual augmentation, so experiences fewer problems with tailoring. The Army tends to

train and deploy in whole units throughout their task organization, but they do have combat service support units that are partly comprised of derivative units. There is a clear opportunity for sharing ideas and approaches that will facilitate wider application of tailored forces.

## ***USING THE INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE***

Better managing the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is another way to increase effective utilization of the force. If some requirements can be filled using the IRR, the need to “break units” might be reduced. But information on the skills and capabilities resident within the IRR is not readily available within all the Services. In many cases the quality of these capabilities — how recently an individual has used particular skills, for example — is unknown as well.

In order to more effectively use the IRR, an up-to-date database needs to be developed with information on the civilian skills, qualifications, and experiences of IRR members, so that specific capabilities can be more readily identified. With such information, the Services can better plan and identify how they might use the IRR in meeting requirements. Moreover each of the Services uses the IRR differently. Sharing experiences and successes could help to expand the use of the IRR across the Services.

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***Recommendations***

***Tailor Forces***

Develop policies and procedures that identify risks and minimize the negative impacts of tailoring

Explore options for designing flexible force structure to meet emerging requirements

Explore better management of the Individual Ready Reserve to increase effective utilization

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## ADOPT BEST BUSINESS PRACTICES

Adopting best business practices can have a significant impact on the efficiency of the mobilization process. Best practices can be drawn from within the Department, as the individual Services all have good ideas that can be expanded in use, as well as from the outside. Four areas of concern were highlighted during the current mobilization: accountability, joint billet validation, automation, and equity. The recommendations put forward are representative of the type of business practice improvements that can be made in other areas of the mobilization process as well.

### *ORGANIZATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY*

Mobilization responsibility is fragmented throughout the Services with no integrating organization to bring the disparate parts together. Staffs from personnel, policy, operations, and logistics typically have a role in some part of the mobilization process. There is little commonality across the Services and the Combatant Commands as to who has responsibility for mobilization, making joint matters difficult to coordinate. Thus, there is often confusion about who is really responsible for mobilization. Moreover, mobilization is often viewed as a Reserve component process. In fact, it is a Total Force concern—one for which that the Active component must take the lead.

Mobilization may no longer be a once-a-decade event, as it has been historically viewed. As a protracted activity, it is time to assign responsibility for integrating and synchronizing the overall process. As a basis for making this decision, it is first necessary to review the framework of responsibilities for all mobilization functions. Once decided, organizational changes should be incorporated into joint doctrine.

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***Recommendations***  
***Organizational Accountability***

Review the framework of responsibilities for mobilization functions

Assign responsibility for the integration and synchronization of the overall process

Incorporate into Joint Doctrine

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***JOINT BILLET VALIDATION***

The current process for validating joint augmentation manpower requirements is in need of review. The recent growth in Combatant Command staff augmentation is evidence of the problem. In many cases, the requirements for staff augmentation have exceeded many times over the positions listed on manning documents and for which the Services have planned. The Services fill these positions through augmentation from both the Active and Reserve forces.

When augmentation requirements are in excess of plans, it can place a burden on the Services. The Services will pull qualified staff from an active or reserve unit, a move that can degrade unit readiness; or they will attempt to meet the requirement with members from the Individual Ready Reserve. In some cases, there are only one or two qualified IRR members, which can cause a problem when replacements are needed as mobilization authorities expire.

A number of things contribute to the growth in command billets, principally a lack of clear requirements. Like the Services, the Combatant Commands are trying to adapt to an environment with changing and increasing requirements. They have yet to truly determine their new peacetime, surge, and wartime

requirements, but need to devote more attention to developing these requirements.

The Combatant Commands need to work with the Joint Staff to better determine peacetime, surge, and wartime requirements and incorporate the billets into their manning documents. The process should address the need to retain some flexibility to adapt when requirements change. The Commands and the Services should also work collaboratively to address requirements, so that the Services can appropriately plan to ensure needed manning resources are available. In addition, the Services need to work to deepen the IRR pool, particularly in skill areas that are in high demand.

In addition, the Services need to develop a joint standing task force ready to respond when contingencies develop. Today the Services create a Joint Task Force Headquarters from an existing Service command each time a contingency begins. There is no standing task force that can either take charge of an operation initially, or take it over from a Service command later in the operation. One approach to this problem could be to develop a Joint Task Force Headquarters using Reserve component members that can take over for the Active component when contingency operations become more predictable.

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***Recommendations***  
***Joint Billet Validation***

Review the effectiveness of the existing Joint Billet Validation process

Develop a wartime Joint Manning Document for a standing joint warfighting headquarters, including standing joint task forces

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## ***AUTOMATION***

Visibility across compatible automated systems exists in the supply requisition process – allowing spare parts to be tracked from requisition to manufacturer and back again. This type of process should exist for tracking mobilized personnel. Current mobilization processes employ many different automated systems through which units or individuals can be integrated and tracked throughout the mobilization process. Today's process is at best a handoff between organizations, where one command hands to another with little or no coordination, communication, or visibility.

The absence of a system to track requirements, personnel and units identified to fill the requirements, and the transportation assets required to move units and personnel, slows response times and can cause confusion and chaos. In many cases individuals will have to enter information on personnel and equipment into multiple systems as units are mobilized and received by various commands. The Defense Integrated Military Human Resource System (DIMHRS) – due for initial deployment in the Army in 2004 – will be a long-term enabler, providing a much bigger picture. But action is needed in the near term.

The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) can provide a capability to track personnel until DIMHRS is available. Their contingency file system contains information such as geographic location, personnel information, contingency identifiers, and time in contingency. With this information the Services can track contingency-related entitlements and benefits with personnel, but the current systems and codes do not provide all of the tracking capability that is needed. Moreover, DMDC relies on the Services for information, but the Services are not in compliance with the PERSTEMPO Contingency Reporting. Thus contingency files are not always accurate due to inadequate Service input. Compliance would provide a near-term solution – a Total Force

tracking capability for location, benefits, and health surveillance for mobilized Reservists.

In the long term, the Department must ensure that appropriate business practices are included in DIMHRS to ensure its effectiveness for mobilization. But an interim solution is needed and for that solution to work, the Services must comply with and allocate the resources and priority necessary meet DoD PERSTEMPO contingency reporting requirements.

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### ***Recommendations***

#### ***Automation***

In the near term, Services must resource improvements to their systems to provide necessary information to DMDC. This would provide a “near real time” solution to some, but not all, tracking requirements.

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## ***EQUITY***

The current mobilization has exposed perceived inequities regarding Service and component policies in areas such as Stop Loss and pay and allowances. While these are passionate issues, there is a general consensus that the Services have to be able to surge and manage their forces and other resources – that this is an area in which the Office of the Secretary of Defense should not have direct control or dictate policy.

### **Stop Loss**

There is some debate about whether a Stop Loss and involuntary mobilization always, as provided in law (10 USC 12305), go hand in hand. Some believe that involuntary mobilization alone does not require the Services to invoke Stop Loss and that in fact the real effects of a Stop Loss on the Reserve



component is negligible. Others feel that if Reserve component forces are involuntarily mobilized, then a Stop Loss should be in effect for the Active component – particularly for those specialties in need. In the end, Stop Loss is a Total Force issue – one that should apply to both the Active and Reserve components and one that should stay a Service prerogative.<sup>3</sup> No policy change is recommended in this area.

## Pay and Allowances

During the current mobilization, differences among the Services in implementing Department pay and compensation policies have come to light. In addition, isolated but visible perceptions of inequity in some current Department duty assignment pay and travel policies have surfaced, impacting mobilized National Guard and Reserve personnel. The Department should consider whether more specific policies are needed to ensure greater consistency in Service personnel and pay policies.

The most common complaint concerning pay and allowances is individuals working side-by-side receive different pay based on different living arrangements. One of the reasons can be traced to Service choices to put Reserve component members on temporary duty status (TDY) or in a permanent change of station status when called to active duty. The different statuses have a direct impact on pay and allowances. The Services generally agree that TDY is the preferred approach, but placing all reservists on TDY can still result in inequities in individual compensation. The per diem paid to troops differs based on

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<sup>3</sup> While stop loss policies should remain a Service prerogative, application of this authority should follow Secretary of Defense direction as follows. In accordance with Secretary of Defense Memorandum, SUBJECT: Partial Mobilization (World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks) and Redlegation of Authority Under Title 10, United States Code, Section 123, 123a, 527, 12006, 12011, 12012, 12302 and **12305** (emphasis added), dated November 9, 2001, “The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall coordinate their exercise of the authorities delegated by this memorandum with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or his designee, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness or his designee prior to their announcement....”

geographic location and whether meals and quarters are provided; even in the same area, accommodations for members can differ by Service.

Personnel pay and allowances will always be based on changing variables. Differences in personnel assignment location and time frames, available resources and infrastructure at the duty site, and Service rotation requirements all have an impact on pay and allowances. To the extent that consistency is desirable, standardization is needed between the Active and Reserve components as well as among the Services. And greater standardization in tracking individuals can help to ensure full application of pay and allowances, as previously discussed. The Services, the Combatant Commanders, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense need to work together to determine what can be done to achieve greater consistency and equity in compensation policies.

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***Recommendations***  
***Equity***

Stop Loss decisions remain a Service responsibility during mobilization  
OSD should work with the Services and Combatant Commands to  
achieve greater consistency regarding per diem and other  
allowances

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## **MAKE JUDICIOUS USE OF RESERVE FORCES**

Reserve component personnel are a highly valued yet limited resource for the nation and the Armed Forces. It is more critical than ever that the Department make the most judicious use of the Reserve forces, particularly in what looks to be a protracted period of high operational tempo. The Reserve components are primarily a part-time force.<sup>4</sup> These citizen-soldiers must balance their duty to country with responsibilities to family, civilian careers, and community.

The Department must carefully consider the use of the Reserve components in meeting requirements for the Global War on Terror over the next decade, being mindful of the frequency and duration of call-ups, making the most prudent use of available volunteers, and exercising involuntary activation judiciously.

### ***TOUR DURATION***

Current DoD policy limits initial mobilization orders to no more than 12 months, with the possibility of extensions to be determined by the Service Secretary. The policy was established in consideration of the part-time nature of reserve service and to protect the individual reserve member. However, for force providers and using commanders the issue is flexibility. From this perspective, the policy may not be appropriate.

The intent of the DoD policy is judicious use, though whether the policy is necessary is open to some debate. On the one hand, the policy does create initial tour boundaries. It requires the Services to examine the issue of replacements, and helps to ensure that forces are being used for the tasks for which they

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<sup>4</sup> About eighty percent of reservists are in part-time status.

were called. In general, the policy creates some degree of constraint on the use of Reserve forces. On the other hand, the policy can be perceived to be too restrictive, limiting flexibility. In some cases, Commanders may have planned on using forces for two years – allowable by law – and now have to “fill the gaps” that the departmental policy creates. So there is tension between the “need for constraints” and the “desire for flexibility.”

Rather than issuing specific guidance, what is needed is a policy that acts as a safeguard and is not overly restrictive, while providing as much predictability as possible for individual service members – a “commanders intent” so to speak. Thus, the Department should modify the one-year policy by publishing a “SecDef’s intent” that emphasizes the judicious use of Reserve component members without restricting Service flexibility. The policy should continue to support the basic principle that Reserve members should be retained on active duty no longer than absolutely necessary to perform essential and meaningful tasks.

## ***VOLUNTEERISM***

The Department of Defense encourages the use of volunteers, including the Individual Ready Reserve and retirees, to reduce the level of involuntary activation. Yet, if not carefully managed, the use of unit member volunteers can have a negative impact on readiness. Moreover, there is currently conflicting guidance that inhibits some, but not all of the Services, from absorbing volunteers – a condition that needs to be resolved.

Volunteers have proven to play a positive role before and during partial mobilization, if used effectively. There is evidence that individual augmentees who are unit members may degrade unit readiness, in some Services, but non-unit volunteers can help to fill skill shortfalls that arise. There are times, for example, when the need for a specific skill set may drive a search for

volunteers to fill the capability. The IRR pool and military retirees can be an important source of capability in this regard.

However, the Services believe that funding constraints, mobilization authorities, and manpower management policies can limit their ability to use volunteers. For example, 10 USC 123a lifted end strength limitations, but Departmental guidance encourages the Services to stay within 2 percent of the limits. Depending on the legal authority in effect at the time, volunteers may count against active duty end strength. Moreover, there is a perception that budgetary constraints make it difficult to use volunteers.

In general, the Department needs a broad and flexible volunteer policy that allows the Services to use volunteers when, and for as long a duration, as practicable. Clearer guidance on end strength accounting and the use of fiscal authorities could help to increase the use of volunteers. The Department should submit a legislative change – to remove the 180-day limitation on active duty end strength exclusions in 10 USC 115(d) – to lift constraints on end strength accounting for volunteers in support of contingency operations.

## ***INVOLUNTARY ACTIVATION***

Today the Department is operating under concurrent multiple involuntary activation authorities – the Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) (title 10, 12304) which authorizes call-up of up to 200,000 selective reservists for up to 270 days; and a partial mobilization (title 10, 12302) authorizing mobilization of up to 1,000,000 ready reserve members for not more than two years. Concurrent authorities bring into question whether the partial mobilization should subsume the PRC authorities and whether there is potential for abuse due to successive call-ups.

Despite concerns, it appears that the Services are managing the multiple authorities without a negative impact on reservists. Multiple authorities provide increased flexibility for the Services by extending the amount of time an individual could serve on active duty. Combining authorities could in fact limit options to access Reserve component members. Moreover the flexibility and predictability of the PRC promotes broader use of volunteers – personnel more willing to serve in an involuntary duty status. Retaining the flexibility of the multiple authorities is a good approach as long as the Services continue to ensure predictability for its members, to the extent possible.

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***Recommendations***  
***Make Judicious Use of Reserve Forces***

Publish “SecDef Intent” to optimize the use of Reserve members without restricting user flexibility

Submit a legislative change to lift constraints on end strength accountability for volunteers in support of contingency operations

Retain flexibility of multiple involuntary activation authorities while ensuring predictability for members

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## ENSURE ADEQUATE SUPPORT

The use of the Reserve components during the Gulf War was a “wake up call” for the Services in all areas of support—individual, family, and employer. As a result, much has been done and there are many success stories. Yet even with significant improvements over the past decade, *there remains a widespread lack of understanding of all facets of support—benefits, protections, and responsibilities.* So it is critical that communication between the Department, the members, and their families be strengthened. Moreover, *additional resources are needed to provide effective family support, equitable healthcare, and sustained employer and educator support.*

### HEALTHCARE

Access to and availability of healthcare for families of deployed Reservists is a critical concern, but solutions can be found in both extending the TRICARE network and improving education.

Access to healthcare is an important issue because approximately 70 percent of Reserve component family members do not live within reasonable proximity to Military Treatment Facilities where network providers are concentrated. Therefore, Managed Care Support Contractors must actively recruit network providers to meet the access needs of the Reserve component family.

TRICARE education is important to ensure that family members are equipped to make educated decisions regarding healthcare options when Reserve members are called to active duty for more than 30 days. A comprehensive education program that provides information on a recurring basis needs to be launched to ensure reservists have healthcare information

prior to deployment and understand the options available to them. Moreover, since TRICARE benefits are contingent on enrolling in the Defense Enrolment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS), it is crucial to emphasize to Reservists, Guardsmen, and their commanders the importance of ensuring that dependents are enrolled in DEERS and that their enrollment information is current and accurate.

When Reserve component members are ordered to active duty for more than 30 days, family members can choose to enroll in the military healthcare system, TRICARE, or continue to use their civilian insurance. Since neither reservists nor their family members are eligible for TRICARE until ordered to active duty, most of them do not take an interest in learning about healthcare benefits until they are notified of a pending mobilization. A recurring education program would allow families to sort out healthcare options – such as maintaining their civilian employer health insurance versus TRICARE options – before a deployment becomes immediate. The pre-deployment period is not an appropriate time for families to make important health insurance decisions because so many issues need to be addressed at that time – these decisions need to be made during peacetime, well before a unit is being considered for mobilization.

Developing a healthcare education program is complicated by the fact that benefits vary depending on length of duty, duty status, and/or type of operation in which the member is involved. For example, family members are eligible for the TRICARE Prime option only if the member has orders for 179 days or longer; family members of reservists serving for 90 days are not eligible. In addition, if the duty status of a Reserve component member changes and a new set of orders are issued without a break in service, the family may be automatically disenrolled from TRICARE Prime or the TRICARE Dental Program without notification.



Furthermore, family members of reservists ordered to active duty in support of Operations NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM and in support of Bosnia-type operations are eligible for different coverage under respective demonstration projects. The various demonstration projects offer benefits such as waiver of deductibles or higher levels of coverage. However, families of reservists ordered to active duty in support of other contingency operations are not eligible for these benefits. Considerable work is needed to develop an approach to medical benefits that ensures continuity and equity of healthcare for reservists and their families.

One approach to improving healthcare support and access to and continuity of care is to expand the number of TRICARE network providers. Engaging other federal agencies in providing healthcare support is another approach to consider. In addition, the Department can extend demonstration projects put in place in support of Bosnia, NOBLE EAGLE, and ENDURING FREEDOM—projects that offer promising improvements and need wider implementation. Several possibilities include the following:

- Establish a TRICARE Prime Remote Demonstration Project for dependents of deployed Reserve component members to test the potential for improving continuity of care for family members.
- Establish a demonstration project to provide TRICARE full time for part time Reserve component members, on a self-pay basis, as a means to enhance the medical readiness of reservists and improve support to families and employers.
- Promote commitment and resources by all the Reserve components for FEDS-HEAL, an agreement to use Veterans Affairs and Federal Occupational Health medical facilities nationwide to provide physical exams, dental screening and care, immunizations and

other medical readiness needs of Reserve component members.

Other steps that the Department should take to improve healthcare for reservists and their families include:

- Eliminate the 179 day active duty sponsor requirement for TRICARE Prime eligibility
- Allow eligible family members to pre-enroll in TRICARE Prime
- Establish a recurring TRICARE education program for Reserve component members and their families
- Establish a stipend/voucher that would offset the cost to reservists of continuing their employer sponsored healthcare plan

## ***FAMILY READINESS***

Guard and Reserve families face many challenges when their military members are performing service. Family members must be aware of and understand their military benefits and how to access them. Reserve families are often not familiar with military organizations, support mechanisms and services, available benefits and privileges, terminology, and military points of contact for assistance. Because of the geographic dispersion of Reserve component families and geographic separation of families from Reserve unit locations, it is often difficult to obtain information about benefits and access support services that are available at military installations. Other challenges may arise when one Service is providing support to families in another Service in the Total Force environment.

Family readiness is a full-time job – spanning from the pre-deployment period through mobilization and post-mobilization. In order to be successful, family readiness personnel and

volunteers must maintain continuous contact with families through all phases of mobilization and deployment. Much of the success in providing adequate family support is effective communication. Today, many outreach programs are passive in nature. The Services need to improve communication with families, becoming more proactive in educating them on benefits and maintaining continuous contact, as mentioned. At the same time, Reserve members must be accountable—ensuring that information is understood and passed on to spouses and other family members.

Although considerable information is available electronically through particular web sites, there are still many members and families unable or unwilling to access this information—so other venues such as handouts, mailings, and town hall meetings, must continue to be used. National 1-800 or 411 numbers that can provide families with points of contact for services in their area is a concept currently under development. In addition to educating the members and their families, individuals involved in the mobilization process need to be educated so they understand the importance and nature of family readiness and its effect on mission readiness.

What is needed in the area of family readiness is more accountability in the system—someone in charge of the program who is responsible for improving it and providing effective incentives to the support providers. Incorporating pre-deployment family readiness into unit status reports along with current military requirements such as personnel, equipment, and training, is a consideration that could improve the priority accorded to family readiness needs.

Increasing standardization across the Services—in requirements, language, and processes—is another solution that can help to ensure families receive consistent support regardless of which Service is providing it. Today, each Service has a different definition of family readiness, which can have an impact

on the ability of families to access help and assistance. Greater cooperation among the Services – through joint and inter-Service programs – could be helpful in providing family support services, particularly to families in remote and isolated areas. One successful program that could be expanded is the Inter-Service Family Assistance Committees – comprised of Active and Reserve component and community agency members – that are in place in Florida, Virginia, Georgia, Kentucky, Texas and a group of small adjacent northeastern states.

Improvements for family support can also draw from the Employee Assistance pilot program, conducted by the National Guard Bureau, which has experienced initial success and should be expanded. In this program, experienced, certified and licensed counselors are available around the clock and can assist members and families in virtually any challenge. Community networks can also play a role – employers and service organizations, for example. The Reserves have a strong tie with the community, yet the government does not take advantage of these networks. To offer assistance, community-based organizations need to understand what is needed and be included in the communication process.

Reserve or “active duty” identification cards, provided to families in advance of deployment can help ensure timely access to support services located on military installations, particularly during cases of family emergencies. In addition, physically locating some family assistance centers off the military installation could be a useful alternative, as higher states of alert are making it more difficult to access military installations.

Most importantly, because of the critical importance of family readiness to Reserve members, this area must become an integral part of the mobilization process – an obligation of both the Services and the Reserve members. Furthermore, despite the many demands for resources, family readiness must be properly resourced to be more effective. Pointing to lack of resources as an

excuse for inadequate family support is a disservice to reservists and their families.

## ***EMPLOYER SUPPORT***

One of the more important recruiting and retention concerns expressed by Reserve component members is civilian job protection. Employers of National Guard and Reserve members are an integral part of the national defense in that they share the burdens of service. Employer support often hinges on “knowing what is going on” – when their employee is needed and for how long. Predictability is also important. So when communications break down, the employer-reservist relationship can suffer.

In order to maintain effective communication with employers, the Services need to know who the employers are. The Defense Manpower Data Center, at the request of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, established the employer database. The individual reservist is the source of the information held in this database. Today there are many gaps in the employer databases and it needs to become mandatory for reservists to provide employer information.

In addition to job protection, loss of compensation is another key concern for Reservists – one that involves the employer as well. Some business leaders have displayed a willingness to do their part, making sure their employees who have been called up do not suffer undue financial hardship. However, there are few protections in place to ensure employer support does not become too great a burden, particularly for small companies with less safety net. Compensation needs to be examined, particularly in the area of income losses among self-employed members and those who are small business owners.

The Services have put considerable effort into employer support since the Gulf War, but emphasis in this area needs to

continue in light of the Global War on Terror. The partial mobilization has entered its second year and it will be critical to continue communications with employers of Reserve members. Regular contacts will help to sustain needed support as the mobilization continues, and perhaps intensifies. DoD manpower resources, such as the Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve, will remain key to sustaining employer support.

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***Recommendations***  
***Ensure Adequate Support***

Strengthen strategic and communication plans for:

- Reserve component family member benefits and entitlements
- DoD Reserve component healthcare benefits and entitlements
- Employer and member rights and responsibilities

Establish legislation and/or resources to ensure

- Appropriate TRICARE benefits across the Total Force
- Quality-of-life and family readiness becomes an integral part of the mobilization readiness process
- Sustained employer outreach (mandatory employer reporting, employer compensation, and DoD manpower resources)

Standardize minimum essential family services to be provided by all Family Support/Assistance Centers and emphasize joint and inter-Service cooperation and assistance

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## THE WAY AHEAD

The Reserve components will continue to be a significant part of the Total Force, operating along side the active-duty force in an environment where the pace of change is rapid, where requirements evolve, and where enemies are far less predictable than in the past. Thus, it is essential to make the mobilization process more relevant and effective in this environment.

The recommendations presented in this report provide a thoughtful foundation for improving the mobilization process for National Guard and Reserve forces. They offer important and constructive suggestions on how to make the process better. Implementation will require leadership within the Department; cooperation and support from Congress; and collaboration among the Military Services, their Components, and the defense agencies.

What is clear from the Mobilization Symposium is that the Services have worked hard to respond to the security challenges facing the nation. They have been innovative and understand the need to be forward leaning. Their ability to listen and learn from each other will be invaluable throughout the implementation process.

The way ahead lies along multiple paths. The most important next steps include the following:

- *Take immediate action on select issues.* The Department needs to begin today to focus its attention on a number of areas. Examples include simplifying and shortening the requirements generation and validation process, streamlining security clearance

procedures, and mobilizing selected individuals of alerted units for duty qualification training.

- ***Identify legislative and management initiatives.*** A number of recommendations require legislative action to implement. Identifying the specific constraints and proposing new language will be a key next step. In addition, there are management challenges that can be acted on within the boundaries of current legislation, such as removing the 180-day rule or making medical and dental treatment available on alert.
- ***Initiate a forum to further develop and implement mobilization process improvements.*** A process action team can be an effective forum through which to continue the work begun in the Mobilization Symposium. Many of the suggested concepts need further development, involving input from a variety of organizations, in order to identify the best approach to implementation. Those who participated in the symposium, as well as many of their colleagues who did not, will have much to offer during the implementation process and a vehicle through which to harness their ideas, inputs, and energy is essential.

The end game is to get the right Reservist, to the right place, at the right time, with the right equipment, for the right mission, to support their active duty counterparts, and then to return home again as soon as it is judiciously possible. The process for getting there is complex, made all the more so by a high level of operational tempo that is likely to continue for some time to come. The recommendations presented here offer ways to streamline the mobilization process, making it increasingly efficient and effective and helping to ensure the National Guard and Reserve will continue to be ready when called.



## APPENDIX A: DISCUSSION PANEL MEMBERSHIP

### *Panel 1: Foundations of Mobilization*

Moderator: The Honorable Charles Abell	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy
The Honorable Albert C. Zapanta	Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board
Lt Gen (Ret) Russell Davis	Past Chief, National Guard Bureau
Maj Gen Arnold Punaro	Director, Reserve Affairs, U.S. Marine Corps
Mr. James Smyser	Office of the General Counsel

### *Panel 2: Operators—Requirements Generators and Mobilization Customers*

Moderator: Maj Gen Robert McIntosh, USAFR	National Guard and Reserve Advisor to CJCS
MG James Darden, USAR	Deputy J-5, U.S. European Command
RADM James Manzelmann, USNR	Commander, Reserve Naval Intelligence Command
BG Bill Johnson, USAF	Deputy J-3/4, U.S. Transportation Command
COL Scott W. Faught, USA	Special Operations Command

*Panel 3: Mobilization Policy & Resources—The Successes and Challenges*

Moderator: The Honorable Reginald Brown	Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
The Honorable William A. Navas	Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
Lt Gen Norton Schwartz, USAF	Director, J-3, Joint Staff
Lt. Gen James Sherrard, USAF	Chief, Air Force Reserve
BGen Thomas Moore, USMC	Director, J-3, Joint Forces Command
RADM Robert J. Papp, USCG	Director, Reserve and Training

*Panel 4: Force Providers—Generating Warfighting Capabilities*

Moderator: The Honorable Michael Dominguez	Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
MG Julian H. Burns, USA	Acting Chief of Staff and G-3, Forces Command
MG Michael Mayo, USAR	Commander, 81 <sup>st</sup> Reserve Support Command
MG Gus L. Hargett, Jr. USA (Army National Guard)	The Adjutant General of Tennessee
Maj Gen Larry Twitchell, USAF	Deputy Commander, U.S. Air Force, Central Command
MG Donald Campbell, USA	Deputy Commander (Support) 8 <sup>th</sup> Army, Korea